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ABSTRACT 
 
This article revisits the claim that mass incarceration constitutes a new 
form of racial segregation, or Jim Crow.  Drawing from historical sources, 
it demonstrates that proponents of the analogy miss an important 
commonality between the two phenomena, namely the debt that each owe 
to progressive and/or liberal politics.  Though generally associated with 
repression and discrimination, both Jim Crow and mass incarceration owe 
their existence in part to enlightened reforms aimed at promoting black 
interests, albeit with perverse results.  Recognizing the aspirational origins 
of systematic discrimination marks an important facet of comprehending 
the persistence of racial inequality in the United States. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Few issues of racial injustice eclipse the mass incarceration of 
African Americans in the United States.
1
  According to the Pew Center on 
the States, one in nine black males between the ages of 20 and 34 is 
“behind bars,” a staggering number that has prompted scholars to draw 
comparisons between black imprisonment today and the legal system of 
racial segregation, or Jim Crow, in the American South.
2
  According to 
criminal law scholar Michelle Alexander, mass incarceration rivals and in 
some aspects even surpasses Jim Crow as a “racialized system of social 
control,” condemning millions of blacks to a “hidden underworld of 
legalized discrimination and permanent social exclusion” in the twenty-
first century.
3
 Junking the shibboleth that American racial politics have 
followed a line of “linear progress” over time, Alexander posits that “it is 
not at all obvious that it would be better to be incarcerated for life for a 
minor drug offense than to live with one’s family, earning an honest wage 
under the Jim Crow regime.”4   
                                               
 Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law; PhD Yale University 2003, JD Duke 
University 1998, BA Wesleyan University 1994.  I would like to thank Andrew Taslitz, 
Meghan Ryan, Tracey Meares, David Sklansky, Jeffrey Fagan, Devon Carbado, 
Christopher Slobogin, Darryl K. Brown, Kami Chavis Simmons, Scott Sundby, Arnold 
Loewy, Eric J. Miller, and Joel Goldstein for input on this piece.  I would like to thank 
Michael Eberlee and Caroline Rutledge for research assistance.  
1 PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 3 
(2008).MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS 8, 188 (2010); Carol S. Steiker, Mass Incarceration: Causes, 
Consequences, and Exit Strategies 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2011); James Forman, Jr. 
Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
21 (2012).  
2 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 8, 188 (2010); Ira Glasser, American Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow, 
63 ALB. L. REV. 703, 723 (2000); James Forman, Jr. Racial Critiques of Mass 
Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21 (2012); Loïc Wacquant, 
From Slavery to Mass Incarceration, 13 NEW LEFT REVIEW 41 (2002); Carol S. Steiker, 
Mass Incarceration: Causes, Consequences, and Exit Strategies, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1 
(2011); PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 3 (2008). 
3 3 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 13 (2010). 
4 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 22 (2010). 
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 Others disagree.  According to civil rights scholar James Forman 
Jr., the Jim Crow analogy “oversimplifies the origins of mass 
incarceration,” meanwhile “diminish[ing] our understanding of the 
particular harms associated with the Old Jim Crow.”5  Forman explains 
how African Americans themselves endorsed “punitive” anti-crime 
measures in the 1970s and 80s, how violent crime played a role in the 
incarceration story, and how black imprisonment disproportionately 
impacts the black poor.
6
  Further, Forman notes that analogies between 
mass incarceration and Jim Crow tend to de-emphasize the “brutal, 
unremitting violence upon which Jim Crow depended.”7 
Though Forman is right to underscore important differences 
between mass incarceration and Jim Crow, he occludes one important 
commonality between the two legal formations, a commonality that 
bolsters Michelle Alexander’s thesis, though not in the way she describes. 
As this Article shall demonstrate, both Jim Crow and mass incarceration 
emerged not simply out of a tendency towards “unremitting violence,” 
racial extremism, or conservative “backlash,” but progressive politics.8  To 
demonstrate, this Article will proceed in four parts.  Part I recovers the 
moderate origins of the old Jim Crow, showing how progressive reformers 
in the American South couched racial segregation and disfranchisement in 
the rhetoric of reducing political corruption, preventing crime, and 
providing blacks with important public accommodations.  Part II shows 
how similarly aspirational impulses helped to lay the foundations for mass 
incarceration, recovering the Supreme Court’s efforts to improve police 
procedure in the 1960s, particularly its inadvertent contribution to the rise 
of aggressive, constitutionally protected strategies of stop and frisk.  Part 
III recovers the role of moderate politics in the rise of mass incarceration, 
focusing on liberal support for the War on Drugs, meanwhile comparing 
that support to moderate endorsements of Jim Crow laws in the turn-of-
the-century South.  Finally, Part IV extends the analogy to gun control, 
showing how federal gun laws popular among liberals have contributed to 
the “entrapment” of black defendants in several midwestern states.  
The road to prison, this Article concludes, has consistently been 
paved with good intentions, progressive efforts at reform that have sought 
to ameliorate racial injustice and reduce racial tension, albeit with perverse 
results.  Progressivism here defined includes turn-of-the-century 
progressives who worked to ameliorate tensions between rich and poor, as 
well as progressive-minded liberals in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s; in essence 
                                               
5 James Forman, Jr. Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23 (2012). 
6 James Forman, Jr. Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 56, 57-58 (2012). 
7 James Forman, Jr. Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 56, 57-58 (2012). 
8 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 22 (2010); James Forman, Jr. Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: 
Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 56, 57-58 (2012). 
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political actors who acted out of a genuine interest in helping the 
dispossessed, meanwhile failing to anticipate the evils of their policy 
decisions.
9
  Recognizing this is important, both for understanding the rise 
of “racialized systems of social control,” and for comprehending racism 
itself.
10
  Though Alexander is not wrong to flag the dangers of backlash, 
class politics, and extremism, her account creates the false impression that 
the political sources of racial inequality are always the product of 
relatively simple, even formulaic political patterns; the rich dividing the 
poor along racial lines, for example, or whites simply legislating their 
prejudice into law.  Sadly, the reality is more complex.  As this article 
shall demonstrate, neither the old nor the new Jim Crow emerged simply 
because white elites “appeal[ed] to the racism and vulnerability of lower-
class whites,” as Alexander claims.11  Nor did racial segregation or mass 
incarceration emerge simply because of “racial indifference,” a concept 
that Alexander defines as “a lack of compassion and caring about race and 
racial groups.”12  On the contrary, racialized systems of social control 
derive their strength from a convergence of interests – to borrow from 
Derrick Bell – including commendable aims like fighting corruption, 
promoting peace, and protecting life.
13
  Indeed, critical to understanding 
“how racial oppression actually works” is close attention to the manner in 
which the evils of oppression stem not simply from animus or indifference 
but also from the deliberate pursuit of the collective good.
14
   
                                               
9 ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW: HOW SOUTHERN MODERATES USED 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS 8 (2009).  
10 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 173 (2010). 
11 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 16 (2010). 
12 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 203 (2010). 
13 I borrow the notion of interest convergence from Derrick Bell.  Though Bell used the 
term to explain why states move to protect the rights of minorities, I argue that it also 
applies to state campaigns that hurt minorities.  See Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of 
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARVARD L. REV. 518 (1980).  
14 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 183 (2010).  As employed here, aspirational racism refers to policies 
that advance the interests of a particular racial group, either by improving its health, 
advancing its ideals,  or protecting it from perceived threats.  It is therefore related to 
what Michel Foucault termed “biopolitics” namely a configuration of power around the 
preservation and promotion of life, a “formative,” “ordering mechanism[]”harnessed to 
“varied progressive projects.”  See, e.g. ANN LAURA STOLER, RACE AND THE EDUCATION 
OF DESIRE: FOUCAULT’S HISTORY OF SEXUALITY AND THE COLONIAL ORDER OF THINGS 
9 (1995).  See also Simona Forti, The Biopolitics of Souls: Racism, Nazism, and Plato 34 
POLITICAL THEORY 9 (2006) (discussing racism as an embodiment of metaphysical 
ideals).  For southern historians who argue that aspirational rhetoric operated essentially 
as a ruse for rationalizing oppression, see C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER 
OF JIM CROW (3rd ed. 1974); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: 
SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-
1910 (1974); JOEL WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE: BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS IN 
THE AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE EMANCIPATION (1984); GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, 
 5 
 
I. JIM CROW’S PROGRESSIVE ROOTS 
 
To fully comprehend the analogy between mass incarceration and 
Jim Crow, it is helpful to flag Michelle Alexander’s particular notion of 
social control.  According to Alexander, racial segregation and mass 
incarceration both embody/ied “racialized” systems of “social control” 
that in turn foster/ed a “racial caste system,” a term that Alexander defines 
loosely to mean any system that locks “a stigmatized racial group” “into 
an inferior position by law and custom,” regardless of whether those laws 
and customs derive from direct racial animus or “indifference.”15  Though 
mass incarceration differs from the “old” Jim Crow in that it does not rely 
on overt racial classifications, the overall impact of America’s criminal 
justice system on black felons, argues Alexander, nevertheless bears 
striking similarities to the impact that segregation had on African 
Americans in the pre-Brown South, including “disfranchisement,” 
“exclusion from juries,” “racial segregation,” and the perpetuation of 
“racial stigma.”16  To document the manner in which such burdens are tied 
to criminal justice, Alexander expands her notion of mass incarceration to 
include “the larger web of laws, rules, policies, and customs that control 
those labeled criminals both in and out of prison,” allowing her to bring in 
thousands of African Americans who leave prison each year only to “enter 
a hidden underworld of legalized discrimination and permanent social 
exclusion.”17 
 The idea of exclusion plays a prominent role in Alexander’s thesis, 
tying her into a much larger historiography of Jim Crow segregation, one 
that casts doubt on the causal elements of her argument.
18
  To 
demonstrate, this section will place Alexander’s thesis within the larger 
context of Jim Crow historiography, showing how it would be better 
served by adopting a more nuanced attention to historian C. Vann 
Woodward, and to his critics.  As we shall see, the notion that white 
“conservatives” simply offered the white poor a “racial bribe” misses 
much of Woodward’s own story, in particular the role that progressive 
rhetoric played in black disfranchisement and segregation. 
19
   
                                                                                                                                            
GENDER AND JIM CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH 
CAROLINA, 1896-1920 (1996). 
15 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 12, 203 (2010). 
16 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 192, 193, 197 (2010). 
17 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 13 (2010). 
18 See e.g., Howard Rabinowitz, From Exclusion to Segregation: Southern Race 
Relations, 1865-1890, 63 JOURNAL OF AMERICAN HISTORY 325 (1976).  
19 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 34 (2010).  For the Woodward thesis, see C. VANN WOODWARD, THE 
STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 50 (3
rd
 ed. 1974). 
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Long before offering poor whites a racial “bribe,” southern 
conservatives had themselves relied on black voters to bolster their power 
from the end of Reconstruction through the 1880s.
20
  By the 1890s, 
however, an economic depression realigned black interests, pushing 
African Americans to favor white “radicals,” or Populists, who sought to 
forge a “pragmatic alliance” across racial lines and against economic 
elites.
21
  Rather than “bribe” poor whites, those elites “bought” and 
“intimidated” black voters into supporting them; undercutting populist 
hopes of interracial reform.
22
  As populism collapsed, argues Woodward, 
conservatives worked diligently to rework southern politics, assuaging 
radical anger at their own manipulation of black votes by calling for 
“disfranchisement of the Negro,” both as a “guarantee” that “white 
factions” would not rally black support “in the future” and also as a 
“progressive” measure aimed at halting political corruption.23 
This last point is significant.  Though Woodward places ultimate 
responsibility for the rise of Jim Crow on the shoulders of extremists, he 
concedes that calls for black disfranchisement struck many at the time as a 
“progressive” reform that challenged conservative interests, even as it 
promised to clean up southern politics.
24
  As Woodward explains it, “the 
typical progressive reformer rode to power in the South on a 
disfranchising or white-supremacy movement.”25  This was true in 
Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia, and other states, so much so that 
“[r]acism was conceived by some as the very foundation of southern 
progressivism.”26 
That racism could be progressive sounds alien to us today.  
However, the racism that moved white voters to endorse Jim Crow in the 
South in the 1890s was deeply intertwined with aspirational ideals, not just 
clean government but other noble goals as well, like fighting crime.  No 
historian demonstrates this more starkly than Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore.
27
  
Focusing on North Carolina, Gilmore shows how a cadre of “young” 
business-minded, “New White Men” sought power not only by employing 
the progressive rhetoric of reducing corruption in government, but also by 
emphasizing “safety of the home.”28  One such progressive, North 
                                               
20 C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 75-76 (3rd ed. 1974). 
21 C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 91, 45 (3rd ed. 1974). As 
radical Populist Tom Watson of Georgia put it, “[y]ou are made to hate each other 
because upon that hatred is rested the keystone of the arch of financial despotism which 
enslaves you both.”  C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 62-3 
(3rd ed. 1974). 
22 C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 79 (3rd ed. 1974). 
23 C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 83 (3rd ed. 1974). 
24 C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 83 (3rd ed. 1974). 
25 C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 91 (3rd ed. 1974). 
26 C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 91 (3rd ed. 1974). 
27 GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER & JIM CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF 
WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1896-1920 (1996). 
28 GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER & JIM CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF 
WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1896-1920 66, 85, 93 (1996).  
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Carolina governor Charles Brantley Aycock, “exaggerated a series of sex 
crimes and allegations in order to strike terror into the hearts of white 
voters,” reframing segregation and disfranchisement as critical to the 
protection of white women.
29
  Though Aycock and his “New White” 
conspirators knew such claims to be false, the extensive efforts they took 
to manufacture a “rape scare” suggest that average white voters in the state 
were unwilling to subordinate blacks without a pressing moral rationale: 
eliminating sexual crime.
30
  Here, the fact that Aycock manipulated 
progressive anti-crime rhetoric underscores the salience of that rhetoric to 
the institutionalization of Jim Crow; whether its proponents believed it or 
not.
31
  
And Aycock did not stop there.  In a move that was even more 
“progressive,” he endorsed segregation as a means not of subordinating 
blacks but preserving for them a base level of social services, including 
education.
32
  As Aycock explained it, Jim Crow saved African Americans 
from an even worse fate than being relegated to separate, inferior 
accommodations: the possibility that they might be denied all public 
accommodations, a condition that historian Howard Rabinowitz has 
termed “exclusion.”33  According to Rabinowitz, even worse fates could 
have befallen blacks than segregation and disfranchisement, including not 
just a blanket prohibition against all public services for blacks, but forced 
removal from the South, even genocide.
34
 Radical leaders like South 
Carolina Governor “Pitchfork” Ben Tillman called for precisely such an 
outcome, promising white voters in 1898 that African Americans needed 
to either “remain subordinate or be exterminated.”35  Meanwhile, others 
declared removal to be the key. According to South Carolina Senator 
Matthew Calbraith Butler, for example, the United States government 
should provide a place of emigration for blacks where African Americans 
could “work out their own destiny.”36  Popular author and Thomas Dixon 
agreed, pushing for the colonization of blacks back to Africa.
37
    
                                               
29 GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER & JIM CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF 
WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1896-1920, 83 (1996). 
30 Gilmore discusses the evidentiary problems with the propaganda warning of a rape 
scare in GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER & JIM CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS 
OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1896-1920 86-88, 94 (1996). 
31 C. Vann Woodward substantiates this point. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE 
CAREER OF JIM CROW 91-92 (3rd ed. 1974).  
32 C. Vann Woodward substantiates this point. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE 
CAREER OF JIM CROW 91-92 (3rd ed. 1974). 
33 HOWARD N. RABINOWITZ, RACE RELATIONS IN THE URBAN SOUTH, 1865-1890 (1978); 
JOHN W. CELL, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF WHITE SUPREMACY 175 (1982). 
34 JOHN W. CELL, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF WHITE SUPREMACY 175 (1982). 
35 STEPHEN KANTROWITZ, BEN TILLMAN & THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WHITE SUPREMACY 
258 (2000); see also Charles Crowe, Racial Violence and Social Reform – Origins of the 
Atlanta Riot of 1906, 53 J. OF NEGRO HIST. 234, 253 (1968). 
36 Plans for the Negro, N.Y. OBSERVER, Oct. 12, 1899, at 41.  
37 Charles Crowe, Racial Violence and Social Reform – Origins of the Atlanta Riot of 
1906, 53 J. OF NEGRO HIST. 234, 245 (1968). For more on Dixon and the brand of 
extremist politics that he endorsed, see GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER AND JIM 
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 Even if removal and genocide were not likely outcomes, an 
increasing number of historians have located the rise of Jim Crow in 
policy initiatives that had little to do with bribing the poor.  In North 
Carolina, for example, the black poor proved less relevant than the black 
middle class, whose success “set off alarms” among poor whites, even as 
“[a] new assertive generation of middle-class African Americans” began 
to “exercise” their rights in “daily actions” on the street.38  Such actions 
often involved direct challenges to white authority, as happened in 
Charlotte, North Carolina in 1882, when a middle class black teenager 
named Jim Harris “pistol-whipped” a white man who had “insulted and 
struck” one of his female friends.39  According to Glenda Gilmore, such 
instances of black middle class defiance stemmed from a very different 
brand of class politics than the kind either Alexander or Woodward focus 
on, not simply elite manipulation of the white poor so much as black 
middle class challenges to white supremacy, a concept that Gilmore reads 
through the southern analytic of “place.”40 
Perhaps nowhere was the concept of place more contested than on 
trains.
41
  “As the number of railroads” in the South “proliferated” in the 
1880s, notes historian Edward Ayers, they created new unregulated spaces 
that forced whites and blacks to mix in uncomfortably close quarters.
42
  
Prior to then, most public accommodations in southern towns and cities 
were segregated as a matter of custom, obviating the need for formal rules 
governing interracial contact.
43
 However, the rise of trains threw blacks 
and whites together in close quarters, a problem that became particularly 
acute in first class cars where affluent whites took umbrage at “educated” 
and “relatively well-to-do” blacks who “insisted on imposing themselves 
on the white people” in the best cars, an increasing problem as “black 
wealth” increased “substantially” in the 1880s.44  On train after train, 
                                                                                                                                            
CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA (1996); 
C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1974).  
38 GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER & JIM CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF 
WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1896-1920, 15 (1996).  
39 GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER & JIM CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF 
WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1896-1920, 74 (1996). 
40 GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER & JIM CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF 
WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1896-1920, 3, 75 (1996). 
41 EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION, 
137, 140 (1992). 
42 EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION, 
140 (1992). 
43 EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION, 
136 (1992).  See also, Howard N. Rabinowitz, From Exclusion to Segregation: Southern 
Race Relations, 1865-1890, 63 JOURNAL OF AMERICAN HISTORY 325 (1976); Howard N. 
Rabinowitz, More Than the Woodward Thesis: Assessing the Strange Career of Jim 
Crow 75 JOURNAL OF AMERICAN HISTORY 842 (1988).  
44 EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION, 
140 (1992). 
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altercations between flustered white elites and “assertive” black elites 
exploded, leading to “overt conflict” and “violence.”45  
Though not a story of elite manipulation of the white poor, battles 
on trains played a critical role in the “first wave of segregation law[s]” to 
emerge in the post-Reconstruction South, forming a cornerstone in the 
racialized system of social control known as Jim Crow.
46
  For example, 
blacks who were denied access to first class cars in the 1880s “resorted to 
the law in increasing numbers,” leading to a string of judicial decisions 
requiring either that railroads reimburse African Americans for their lost 
seats or, more commonly, provide equal accommodations to white and 
black passengers.
47
  Separating passengers by race, argued state and 
federal judges alike, encouraged “peace, order, convenience, and 
comfort,” all laudable ideals.48 
Despite judicial orders that railroads provide separate 
accommodations, railroad companies balked at the “considerable expense 
and trouble of running twice the number of cars.”49  Outraged, legislators 
across the South then moved to require separate accommodations by 
statute, leading Tennessee to commence the “first legislative attempt at 
statewide segregation” in the South in 1881.50  Other states followed, 
stressing not simply that whites be free from black encroachments but also 
that blacks be protected from white abuses.
51
  For example, Florida 
enacted a law in 1887 holding that “[n]o white person shall be permitted to 
ride in a [N]egro car or to insult or annoy any [N]egro in such car.”52  
Even if middle class whites did not want middle class blacks in their cars, 
in other words, they also did not want poorly behaved whites embarrassing 
them by disturbing black passengers, pointing to segregation’s complex 
role as a disciplinary mechanism targeting members of both races.
53
   
Contrary to Alexander’s story that Jim Crow simply targeted the 
working class, the regulation of trains in the South indicates that the 
                                               
45 EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION, 
139 (1992). 
46 EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION, 
145 (1992). 
47 EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION, 
142 (1992). 
48 EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION, 
142 (1992). 
49 EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION, 
142 (1992). 
50 EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION, 
143 (1992).  See also C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 97 (3rd 
ed. 1974). 
51 EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION, 
143-4 (1992). 
52 EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION, 
143-4 (1992).  See also HOWARD N. RABINOWITZ, RACE, ETHNICITY, AND 
URBANIZATION: SELECTED ESSAYS 155-6 (1994). 
53 EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION, 
143-4 (1992).   
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origins of segregation lay partly in a revolt by white middle class 
progressives, or “New White Men,” against white elites, particularly 
corporate elites who owned and operated trains.
54
  In state after state, 
explains historian Edward Ayers, “one politician after another” “turned to 
the control of corporations,” particularly railroads, hoping to stem their 
“grasping, selfish, tyrannical,” and “overbearing demeanor.”55  Though 
blacks protested their eviction from white cars, in other words, the whites 
orchestrating those evictions did not necessarily represent the white 
financial elite, but rather a rising middle class in the South who sought not 
simply to divide and conquer the poor, but also to regulate the rich.
56
  
Indeed, if the southern middle class wanted anything, it was to curb both 
“greedy monopolies” and also “unruly citizens.”57  Segregation, to them, 
embodied a “sophisticated, modern, managed” approach to race relations, 
an approach that quickly spread from train cars to train stations to all 
manner of other public spaces, including waiting rooms, restrooms, water 
fountains, and so on.
58
 
Recovering the origins of segregation on trains helps to 
demonstrate the manner in which progressive goals ended up having 
profoundly repressive effects.  Rather than examples of white elites 
manipulating the white poor, train statutes embodied a very different 
regulatory move, an effort by middle class whites to police their own 
ranks and also to protect the peace and tranquility of first class passengers 
white and black.  
59
 
That racial segregation may have been a modern, even progressive 
solution to problems of racial strife is a point that C. Vann Woodward 
concedes briefly in Strange Career, and that subsequent historians have 
elaborated upon.
60
  For example, both John W. Cell and Howard 
Rabinowitz argue that segregation was a moderate alternative to even 
harsher policies of racial exclusion.
61
  According to Cell, “the ideology of 
segregation was not the contribution of the most fanatical, ignorant, 
unbending racists of the period” but rather a legal regime sponsored by 
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59 Though Alexander may be right that such protections proved, over time, to be “a legal 
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“moderate men” who “sought civility, peace, and harmony.”62  According 
to Rabinowitz, Radical Republicans first introduced segregation to the 
South as part of a larger effort to provide blacks access to services that had 
previously been denied them, including public schools, welfare, and health 
care.
63
  Such arguments lend credence to Alexander’s point that the 
exclusionary effects of mass incarceration may actually be more damaging 
than Jim Crow; even as they underscore the larger conclusion, counter to 
Alexander, that new systems of racial control are often rationalized in 
progressive, forward-looking terms – not simply as expressions of animus 
or indifference.
64
 
Alexander’s failure to adequately capture the aspirational rhetoric 
of white southerners post-Reconstruction, prevents her from adequately 
explaining how Jim Crow emerged and – more importantly – how mass 
incarceration echoes it.  The next section will demonstrate how moderate, 
even liberal reform led to a similar pattern at mid-century, as exemplified 
by the rise of formalized rules sanctioning police stop and frisks, a 
technique that Alexander cites repeatedly as a contributor to mass 
incarceration.
65
  Proponents of such reforms included northern liberals 
desperate to correct unforeseen, negative consequences of the Supreme 
Court’s pro-defendant ruling in Mapp v. Ohio.  Much like the moderate 
politics that animated the first Jim Crow; such efforts engendered 
unexpected, arguably perverse results.  
 
 
 II. THE STRANGE CAREER OF STOP AND FRISK 
 
 Even as progressive politics contributed to the rise of racial 
segregation, so too did liberal initiatives confound black interests in the 
civil rights era.  Few examples provide a better illustration than Mapp v. 
Ohio, a pivotal case in the Warren Court’s criminal procedure 
revolution.
66
  As this section shall demonstrate, the Court’s effort to curb 
police abuses against blacks in Mapp in 1961 ended up having an 
unanticipated effect, worsening police minority tensions in urban centers 
like New York.  Praised by liberals for extending the exclusionary rule to 
the states, Mapp pushed many police to adopt aggressive means of 
questioning and evidence gathering on the street, prompting moderate 
reformers to lobby for a structured approach to stopping suspicious 
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1138-140 (1994). 
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COLORBLINDNESS 77, 103, 124-25 (2010). 
66 PRISCILLA H. MACHADO ZOTTI, INJUSTICE FOR ALL: MAPP VS. OHIO AND THE FOURTH 
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persons.  In 1965, the New York State Legislature heeded such efforts by 
adopting a “stop and frisk” law that ultimately survived Supreme Court 
review, contributing to what Alexander terms the first phase of mass 
incarceration.
67
   
 By recovering the progressive origins of stop and frisk, this section 
seeks to make two points.  First, the origins of policies that increased rates 
of minority incarceration in America did not necessarily result from 
conservative efforts to divide the poor along racial lines.  Second, 
Alexander occludes an important component of the mass incarceration 
story, namely liberal efforts to improve racial inequality by emphasizing 
procedural rather than substantive reform.  Though scholars tend to cite 
1968 as a key turning point in Warren Court jurisprudence, a moment 
when liberal impulses on the Court succumbed to a conservative “counter-
revolution,” this section suggests a more fractured narrative – one in 
which liberals and conservatives alike tolerated expansions of private 
liberty so long as such expansions did not threaten public violence.
68
   
 The case began when police discovered obscene material in the 
home of Cleveland resident Dollree Mapp following an aggressive, 
warrantless search.
69
  Though Mapp’s attorneys fought to exclude the 
evidence at trial, they abandoned that position on appeal, arguing instead 
that Ohio’s obscenity statute was unconstitutionally vague and that 
Mapp’s arrest was so outrageous as to warrant an acquittal.70  This latter 
argument followed Rochin v. California, a 1952 Supreme Court case 
chastising police for ordering a defendant’s stomach pumped to retrieve 
heroine, something the Court found so egregious that it not only “shocked 
the conscience,” but violated the Constitution.71  Just as unconstitutional, 
argued Mapp’s counsel, was Ohio’s obscenity law, a relatively recent 
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measure that expanded criminal liability from manufacturers and sellers of 
pornography to private citizens.
72
 
Yet, it was not the outrageous nature of Ohio’s obscenity statute so 
much as the “racist police abuse” in Mapp that “convinced” the Supreme 
Court “to extend federal supervision to state criminal justice.”73 Ignoring 
the obscenity issue, the Court moved instead to incorporate the 
exclusionary rule to the states, suddenly protecting average citizens from 
warrantless searches by local police.
74
  For many at the time, the decision 
constituted a clear victory for civil rights, and seemed to have an 
immediate positive impact on law enforcement.
75
 According to Richard 
Kuh, Secretary of the New York State District Attorney’s Association, 
police did in fact become more serious about acquiring warrants before 
conducting searches of private homes following the ruling.
76
  Prior to 
Mapp, claimed Kuh, officers rarely requested a warrant before searching 
an individual’s private “apartment, home, flat, [or] loft.”77  “All this has 
changed,” he argued in September of 1962, noting that tendencies toward 
ignoring warrant requirements “changed overnight.”78 
 However, Mapp engendered unanticipated reactions on the street.  
Almost immediately, arrests for illegal lottery or “policy” violations 
dropped in New York City, totaling a thirty-five percent decline by the 
end of the year.
79
  Convictions for “narcotics misdemeanor offenses” also 
dropped, along with convictions for “contraband – possession of weapons, 
[and] obscene prints.”80  Such declines, declared law enforcement, 
stemmed from officer confusion over  whether they could lawfully search 
suspects who were not officially under arrest.
81
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 While a drop in arrests might be taken as a positive for blacks on 
the street, police testimony became increasingly “improbable” in cases 
that did go to trial, many officers testifying that suspects simply 
“removed” objects from their pockets and “threw” them to the ground, 
dispensing with the need for a search.
82
  Meanwhile, police assigned to 
search private homes began increasingly to claim that they had been 
“invited” in by defendants, again precluding the need for a warrant.83  Not 
only did Mapp lower arrest rates, in other words, it also encouraged police 
to stretch the truth, telling more elaborate “stories” to bolster the arrests 
they did make.
84
 
 In a study of almost 4,000 arrests, New York Legal Services 
offered hard data that Mapp negatively impacted police testimony, 
pushing officers to claim that suspects mysteriously “dropped” contraband 
before being approached and searched.
85
  The New York Police 
Department (NYPD) reported a 71.8 percent spike in such “dropsies” 
during the year immediately following Mapp.
86
  Meanwhile, reports that 
police found contraband “hidden on the person” of suspects declined 
significantly at precisely the same time, indicating that police were 
suddenly cautious about admitting to searches.
87
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 An NYPD officer provided a clue into the new dynamics of post-
Mapp evidence recovery during an illegal search trial in New York City 
on September 12, 1962.
88
  Charged with unlawfully searching a suspect, 
the officer claimed that he “frisked” suspects but did not actually search 
them.
89
  The officer then demonstrated a standard frisk before the court, a 
relatively violent maneuver that aimed to shake evidence to the ground.
90
  
Rather than simply pat down the suspect’s clothing, for example, the 
patrolman “grabbed” the suspect “and practically lifted him off his feet”; 
meanwhile shaking him to loosen any items that might be secreted in his 
pockets, waistband, or belt.
91
  As a cigarette lighter and pair of eyeglasses 
“fell” to the floor, the manner in which a frisk might generate a drop 
suddenly became apparent, leaving open the question whether Mapp’s 
prohibition on searches also applied to frisks, even forceful ones like the 
one demonstrated by the officer.
92
 
 Even if officers decided against frisks, police developed other 
means of procuring evidence from suspects without resorting to a search.
93
  
In Cincinnati, for example, patrolmen “rush[ed]” suspects, “hoping to 
produce a panic” that would then lead them to “visibly discard” 
evidence.
94
  Here too, the Court’s application of the exclusionary rule had 
a counterintuitive effect; increasing the likelihood that police would 
engage in threatening behavior to get suspects to drop evidence.
95
 
 Police efforts to induce dropped evidence indicate that rather than 
improve police conduct, Mapp actually intensified the use of force, lying, 
and deception, particularly on the street.
96
  However, even Mapp’s effect 
on the search of homes and apartments came into question.   According to  
New York Legal Services, for example, the actual location of arrests 
generally seemed to migrate out of private rooms and into public spaces 
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following the decision.  To illustrate, the location of most arrests prior to 
Mapp were streets (35%) and “unexplained rooms” (26%) meaning 
“rooms entered without explanation by the police.”97  Following the 
ruling, however, police reported lower numbers of arrests in unexplained 
rooms, dropping them from 26% to 17.6%, meanwhile increasing arrests 
in “hallways,” “roof landings,” and “basements.”98 
 Just as Mapp may have pressured officers to acquire warrants 
before entering homes, so too did the decision seem to refocus police 
attention on public space.
99
  Rather than simply improve police 
professionalism, in other words, the decision also influenced the contours 
of police corruption, removing it from private homes to public areas 
(streets, hallways, roof landings, and basements), where police could then 
shake down suspects for evidence.
100
  As New York Legal Services 
described it, officers simply “stopped entering private rooms” and turned 
instead to spending “more time in the streets and halls.”101  Rather than 
“level the playing field” between rich and poor, in other words, Mapp 
simply provided more privacy to the already well-off, particularly those 
wealthy enough to conduct their social and professional lives behind 
closed doors.
102
  Conversely, poor residents of cramped apartments and 
public housing projects – those most likely to utilize public spaces and the 
streets for social interaction – –found themselves the targets of intensified 
police searches in their halls, landings, and sidewalks; all factors 
increasing the likelihood that African Americans might be incarcerated for 
random, search-generated crimes.
103
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 As Mapp engendered negative effects, reformers moved to clarify 
the constitutional landscape, pushing the playing field even further in the 
direction of mass incarceration, albeit unwittingly.  By March of 1962, for 
example, New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller joined police in 
declaring that “confusion” had become Mapp’s primary contribution to the 
law of search and arrest.
104
 To rectify matters, Rockefeller endorsed a 
statute authorizing officers “to search and question a person” suspected of 
committing a crime “without making an arrest.”105  The law allowed for 
pat down searches in cases where police possessed a reasonable suspicion 
that the suspect might be armed, solving one of Mapp’s primary 
ambiguities.
106
   
 Not everyone approved.  Black leaders in New York objected to 
the stop and frisk legislation, arguing “that it would help create a ‘police 
state’ by subjecting the people of their districts to ‘even greater abuse than 
they now suffer at the hands of police.’”107  At the time, the “highest 
concentration” of arrests in New York occurred in predominantly black 
neighborhoods, most notably Harlem.
108
  According to black politicians, 
New York’s stop and frisk law would “allow policemen to ‘push around’ 
citizens and permit them to operate as ‘the Gestapo.’”109  Such criticism 
indicated that not everyone, particularly not African Americans, believed 
that the corrupt practices engendered by Mapp would necessarily be 
solved by sanctioning stop and frisks.
110
  
 While black fears proved prescient, the Supreme Court of the 
United States approved the Empire State’s law in a 1968 case styled 
Sibron v. New York, holding that officers could “stop and frisk” suspects 
so long as they possessed “reasonable suspicion” that individuals were 
either “engaged in criminal activity” or posed “a danger.”111   Though 
criticized by black leaders, the Court confessed to having noble objectives, 
even citing the excesses generated by Mapp, including its encouragement 
of police tactics aimed at creating the illusion of dropped evidence.
112
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Further, the Court acknowledged in a companion case styled Terry v. Ohio 
that “frisking” had indeed become “a severely exacerbating factor in 
police-community tensions.”113 
 Much like early Jim Crow laws found themselves packaged in 
progressive rhetoric, so too did the formalization of stop and frisk rules in 
New York City provide a case study in the complexities, and evils, of 
reform.  Though stop and frisk would contribute to mass incarceration, the 
formalization of the procedure emerged as a moderate solution to post-
Mapp confusion, a corrective to an unforeseen development not of 
reactionary racism, but the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution.  
Michelle Alexander misses this, concluding simply that  the “first step” in 
the mass incarceration of blacks was the Supreme Court’s decision “to 
grant law enforcement officials extraordinary discretion regarding whom 
to stop, search, arrest, and charge for drug offenses,” i.e. Terry v. Ohio.114  
Rather than simply a conservative plot to divide the working class, 
however, Mapp’s impact on stop and frisk resulted from a more complex 
sequence of events, suggesting a story about reform, reaction, and 
compromise, a convergence of conservative and liberal interests that 
contributed to mass incarceration.
115
  As the next section shall 
demonstrate, a similar narrative haunted the War on Drugs.  
 
III. THE LIBERAL WAR ON DRUGS 
 
Progressive reforms that rendered evil results did not end with the 
exclusionary rule.  As race riots drew national attention to the American 
ghetto in the 1960s, liberals began to lament the profusion of controlled 
substances in predominantly poor, black neighborhoods, prompting calls 
for harsher penalties to protect African American communities.
116
  As 
James Forman, Jr. shows, even “black activists” requested such penalties, 
a point that Michelle Alexander downplays; blaming harsh drug policies 
on conservative efforts to break up “a solid liberal coalition based on 
economic interests of the poor and the working and lower-middle 
classes.”117  Though conservatives did seek working and lower-middle 
class votes, the War on Drugs proved more complicated than Alexander 
implies, a point this section shall demonstrate by focusing on liberal 
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support for heightened penalties that would, by the end of the twentieth 
century, contribute greatly to mass incarceration in the United States.
118
  
Launched in the 1980s, the War on Drugs initially began as an 
effort to “go beyond traditional law enforcement,” by focusing on 
“education,” “treatment,” “research” and “foreign intervention,” a 
campaign that garnered support from liberals and conservatives alike.
119
  
To illustrate, one of the earliest proponents of the war was Democratic 
Senator Joseph Biden, who became “convinced that the government 
needed a cabinet-level director of narcotics policy,” or drug “czar” to 
coordinate federal domestic and foreign efforts to thwart drug 
trafficking.
120
  Meanwhile, liberals like Massachusetts Senator Edward 
Kennedy lobbied for uniform sentencing guidelines, hoping “to reduce the 
number of cases in which judges in different courts imposed widely 
varying sentences,” particularly in cases involving minorities.121  Though 
“well intended,” such guidelines turned out to have a negative impact on 
blacks, partly because of poor planning.
122
  For example, even though drug 
sentences were set under the guidelines, “[m]id-level” dealers, who tended 
to be white, found that they were able to procure lower sentences by 
exchanging lower charges for “fingering higher-ups,” while lower level 
dealers, who tended to be black, “had no such bargaining chips [and] 
ended up getting higher sentences.”123 
Just as sentencing guidelines emerged out of a series of poorly 
planned, unintentional, yet frequently well-meaning initiatives, so too did 
liberals endorse the decision to increase penalties for crack cocaine in 
1986 – a move that Alexander argues “greatly exacerbated racial 
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disparities in incarceration rates.”124  “Lacking detailed information,” 
officials on all sides of the political spectrum began to call for increased 
penalties for crack in 1985, after a series of news stories linking the drug 
to violence began to make national headlines.
125
  Early proponents of such 
a move included popular liberals like Democratic Senator Gary Hart, who 
claimed that crack caused “raging paranoia” and “senseless deaths.”126  
Democratic Senator Lawton Chiles of Florida declared that crack turned 
users into “slaves” while black Senator Charlie Rangel joined Nancy 
Reagan’s “Just Say No” to drugs campaign, even as he declared that 
“[w]hat is most frightening about crack is that it made cocaine widely 
available and affordable for abuse among our youth.”127  Though 
Republican Senator Bob Dole recommended a mandatory minimum for 
crack “20 times higher” than for powder cocaine, it was Democrats who 
proposed a 100 to 1 ratio, all in the hopes of doing “something to save the 
black community.”128  The death of black college basketball player Len 
Bias in June 1986 only intensified liberal furor, speeding enactment of the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 establishing substantially different penalties 
for crack versus powder cocaine.
129
 
Though Alexander cites the 1986 Anti-Abuse Act’s role in 
spurring “racial disparities in incarceration rates,” she fails to adequately 
account for the role that liberal hopes and aspirational rhetoric played in 
the legislative history of the act.
130
  Instead, she focuses single-mindedly 
on moves by “the Reagan administration” to “publicize the emergence of 
crack” as part of a larger, “strategic effort to build public and legislative 
support” for the War on Drugs, which was announced in 1982, “before 
crack became an issue in the media”131  However, Republicans were 
actually “taken aback” that Democrats pushed for longer sentences than 
“the traditionally hardline Republicans had in mind.”132 Further, news of 
crack’s destructive effects pushed liberals to call for a de-emphasis on 
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Columbian cartels and a renewed focus on urban communities, inspiring 
noted liberals like New York Mayor Edward Koch to declare that it was 
“time to raise the battle flag” on drugs in 1988.133  Others followed, 
arguing as Princeton Professor John J. Dilulio, Jr. did in 1993 that “[n]o 
new engines of inner-city job growth and revitalization can be started 
unless and until the drug-and-crime epidemic is checked,” a move that 
warranted “increas[ing] our big-city police forces and prison capacity as 
much as is necessary to make inner-city criminals and street gangsters 
aware that we are fighting a war on drugs.”134  
As Dilulio indicates – and Alexander argues – the War on Drugs 
did contribute directly to the evil of mass incarceration.  However, the 
origins of that war stemmed not simply from a conservative conspiracy, as 
Alexander implies, but a complex set of concerns, including a liberal 
desire to help minorities trapped in high crime neighborhoods.  By 
ignoring this side of the story, Alexander provides only a partial account 
of “how racial oppression actually works,” meanwhile missing a key 
parallel between mass incarceration and the old Jim Crow, namely the role 
that progressive politics and positive aspirations played in the creation of 
both regimes.
135
   
Yet another problem with Alexander’s comparison between mass 
incarceration and the old Jim Crow relates to her larger point about racial 
caste.  Though she is certainly right to claim that today’s criminal justice 
system creates an “undercaste” of ex-convicts, it actually does much more 
than that.
136
  Like the criminal penalties invoked when individuals violated 
Jim Crow laws, so too do current criminal penalties punish poor, 
unskilled, and uneducated minorities who seek to escape their lower class 
predicament.  As sociologist Jennifer Hamer notes in her recent study of 
life and crime in East St. Louis, Illinois; African Americans living in 
poverty-stricken, predominantly black areas – whether inner cities or 
suburbs – face few legitimate avenues of upward mobility.137  Cursed with 
inferior schools, limited opportunities, and no money, the isolated poor 
rely heavily on crime, whether prostitution or drugs, to escape 
deprivation.
138
  Though such individuals may be able to scrape out an 
existence on minimum wage jobs and legitimate part-time work, what 
Hamer calls “clean” hustles, their hopes of rising out of the lower class 
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often hinge on resorting to some kind of illegal activity, or “dirty 
hustle.”139  “In a poor place like East St. Louis,” notes Hamer, “the 
decision to hustle is normal,” rational, and one of the few available options 
for those desiring “something better.”140  
If Alexander placed more emphasis on Hamer’s rationalization of 
the hustle, an acknowledgment that crime provides an important, available 
escape from caste, then she would be able to bolster her own argument 
about the “many parallels” between mass incarceration and Jim Crow, also 
a system that criminalized black efforts to transcend their plight.
141
  
However, placing more emphasis on reasons why disadvantaged 
individuals might legitimately decide to commit crime would presumably 
undermine Alexander’s single-minded claim that both mass incarceration 
and Jim Crow derive from conservative “divide-and-conquer” politics, 
forcing her instead to make the less polemical point that a broad 
constellation of forces actually explains mass incarceration.
142
  Some of 
these forces undoubtedly stem from conservative politics, while others 
involve minority efforts to rise out of poverty, not to mention liberal 
efforts to help minorities that have gone horribly awry, engendering 
perverse results.  
Liberal support for harsh sentences remains the most interesting 
aspect of America’s mass incarceration story, yet Alexander largely 
ignores it.  Her occlusion marks perhaps the greatest weakness of her Jim 
Crow analogy, muddling her history of racialized systems of social 
control, meanwhile obscuring prescriptive solutions for dismantling those 
systems.  For example, Alexander concludes her study by asking why the 
“civil rights community” has “been so slow to acknowledge” the problem 
of mass incarceration in America.
143
  She posits that one problem has been 
an over-emphasis on litigation as a means of social change, together with a 
growing rift between civil rights lawyers and those most vulnerable to the 
criminal justice system.
144
  Missing is sufficient acknowledgment of the 
bipartisan zeal for punishment that swept the nation in the 1980s and 90s, 
spurred by conservatives and liberals alike who believed that 
imprisonment might actually help the poor.
145
  
                                               
139 JENNIFER F. HAMER, ABANDONED IN THE HEARTLAND: WORK, FAMILY, AND LIVING IN 
EAST ST. LOUIS 105 (2011). 
140 JENNIFER F. HAMER, ABANDONED IN THE HEARTLAND: WORK, FAMILY, AND LIVING IN 
EAST ST. LOUIS 105 (2011). 
141 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 17 (2010). 
142 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 34 (2010). 
143 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 223 (2010). 
144 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 225 (2010). 
145 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 229 (2010). 
 23 
Though liberal efforts to embrace the “most oppressed” actually 
contributed to mass incarceration, Alexander keeps her sights on 
conservatives, arguably missing an opportunity to accomplish her ultimate 
objective, namely winning support for dismantling the American prison 
state.  For example, Alexander might be able to pick up conservative 
supporters by selling mass incarceration as a misguided effort at big 
government, stressing the waste involved in providing “[f]ederal grant 
money for drug enforcement” meanwhile maintaining a massive “criminal 
justice bureaucracy.”146  Such concerns could then be merged with a more 
traditionally liberal compassion for the poor, all the while marshaling her 
data to prove that lowering criminal sentences and ending the War on 
Drugs makes bipartisan sense.  However, such a move would require 
junking her divide and conquer thesis in favor of a more nuanced attention 
to the evils wrought by liberal reform.
147
  As the next section shall 
demonstrate, a similar argument could be brought to bear on the question 
of guns.  
 
 
 
IV. THE LIBERAL WAR ON GUNS 
 
 A final critique of Alexander’s thesis emerges from yet another 
field that has enjoyed liberal support but contributed to the mass 
incarceration of African Americans, namely federal gun regulation.  
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §846 and 18 U.S.C. §924, defendants found in 
possession of firearms who either have past felony convictions or 
involvement in drug trafficking, face additional prison time for carrying a 
weapon.
148
 
The manner in which such gun regulations contribute to mass 
incarceration recently became evident in several Midwestern states as 
federal agents staged elaborate stings to net defendants suspected of drug 
distribution.  To take just one example, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) joined city police in St. Louis, 
Missouri in a four month joint operation during the spring of 2013 that 
netted 159 defendants and 267 guns.
149
  Though hailed by city officials as 
a victory against violent crime, the overwhelming number of defendants 
apprehended by the ATF turned out to be African American, even as 
questions arose concerning the predatory nature of the operation.
150
  For 
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example, “court records and interviews” revealed that the ATF had relied 
on three primary strategies for apprehending suspects in St. Louis: 1) 
“street-level drug purchases and arrests,” 2) “a sting involving a fake drug 
stash house,” and 3) a “St. Louis storefront used to buy guns151 
In the case of the storefront, federal agents opened a tattoo parlor 
and then repeatedly asked customers if they might be able to sell them 
firearms and drugs.
152
  Meanwhile, the stash house scheme featured an 
“undercover agent pretending to be a disgruntled drug courier” who 
actively “recruit[ed] others willing to rob a stash house claimed to be 
packed with drugs, and guarded by armed members of a fictional drug 
ring.”153  Once agents identified a “prospective” robber, they would then 
“repeatedly” ask that individual if they were “prepared to go through with 
the plan” and, if so, whether they could procure a weapon “to pull it 
off.”154   Once the unwitting robber acquired a weapon to conduct the 
imagined federal scheme, “[a]gents and police” would “swoop” down and 
arrest them.
 155
  Finally, federal agents conducted a series of “street-level 
drug purchases” during which undercover officers alternately purchased 
drugs and guns, only to then arrest the surprised sellers for federal 
offenses.
 156
 
Defense attorneys in St. Louis criticized several aspects of the ATF 
tactics, particularly the phony drug house raids.  According to them, 
federal agents “lured” unwitting, “nonviolent drug dealers” into the drug 
raid scheme “with promises of huge payouts” that attracted individuals 
who would not otherwise have committed a home invasion, meanwhile 
using the “fictional amounts of drugs” invented by police to charge the 
defendants with federal narcotics offenses.
 157
   
Similar operations in other states incurred similar criticism.  For 
example, a “fake ATF store” in Milwaukee drew criticism for “offering 
such high prices for guns that some were bought from local retailers and 
immediately resold to the agents.”158  Meanwhile, Judge Richard Posner of 
the Seventh Circuit argued that a fake ATF stash house scheme in Chicago 
presented sufficient evidence of entrapment to be submitted to a jury 
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precisely because it involved big money inducements.
159
  According to 
Posner, “extraordinary inducements” demonstrate “that the defendant’s 
commission of the crime for which he’s being prosecuted is not reliable 
evidence that he was predisposed to commit it.”160  In the Chicago case, 
styled U.S. v. Kindle, one of the defendants “had never robbed a stash 
house,” nor had he ever “been convicted of a drug offense.”161   In fact, 
after being released from prison in 2005 for an unrelated offense, the 
defendant “had tried to go straight – moving away from the city in which 
he’d lived and had had criminal associates and getting a legal job.”162  
Convinced that the ATF had induced a reformed offender back into a life 
of crime, Posner lamented that the defendant “had earned his GED, an 
associate’s degree, and three vocational certificates in prison, and upon 
release had devoted personal time to volunteer activities.”163   Despite 
such good works, however, the defendant nevertheless proved vulnerable 
to the government’s ridiculously high offer of “5 to 7 kilograms of cocaine 
with a street value of $135,000 to $189,000” for completion of the phony 
raid; an inducement “unlike any Mayfield” had ever seen.164  According to 
Posner, “a reasonable jury could have found that [the defendant] was not a 
stash house robber, or even a drug dealer of any sort, was not predisposed 
to attempt a stash house robbery, and accepted the invitation because of 
financial desperation.”165  Put simply, ATF stash house schemes amounted 
to a “disreputable tactic” employed by law enforcement to arrest 
minorities, “increase the amount of drugs that can be attributed to the 
persons stung,” and “jack up their sentences.”166   
That St. Louis Police Chief Sam Dotson praised such stash house 
schemes proved uncontroversial until conservatives in the state proposed a 
bill aimed at curtailing federal enforcement of gun laws in the state.
167
  
Styled House Bill 436, the measure represented, for many, a reactionary 
move by conservatives to impugn talk of tightening gun regulations 
following the massacre of school children by a deranged individual in 
Sandy Hook, Connecticut in December 2012.
168
   However, even as 
liberals across the state lamented the bill, few recognized the law as a 
                                               
159 U.S. v. Kindle, 698 F.3d 401 (2012) (Posner, J. concurring and dissenting). 
160 U.S. v. Kindle, 698 F.3d 401 (2012) (Posner, J. concurring and dissenting). 
161 U.S. v. Kindle, 698 F.3d 401 (2012) (Posner, J. concurring and dissenting). 
162 U.S. v. Kindle, 698 F.3d 401 (2012) (Posner, J. concurring and dissenting). 
163 U.S. v. Kindle, 698 F.3d 401 (2012) (Posner, J. concurring and dissenting). 
164 U.S. v. Kindle, 698 F.3d 401 (2012) (Posner, J. concurring and dissenting). 
165 U.S. v. Kindle, 698 F.3d 401 (2012) (Posner, J. concurring and dissenting). 
166 U.S. v. Kindle, 698 F.3d 401 (2012) (Posner, J. concurring and dissenting) citing Eda 
Katharine Tinto, Undercover Policing, Overstated Culpability 34 CARDOZO LAW REV. __ 
(2013).  
167 St Louis Police Chiefs, Mo. Police Union Oppose Gun Law Veto Override, Sept. 5, 
2013. Retrieved Oct. 18, 2013 from http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2013/09/05/in-letter-to-
house-speaker-chief-fitch-opposes-gun-law-veto/ 
168 St Louis Police Chiefs, Mo. Police Union Oppose Gun Law Veto Override, Sept. 5, 
2013. Retrieved Oct. 18, 2013 from http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2013/09/05/in-letter-to-
house-speaker-chief-fitch-opposes-gun-law-veto/ 
 26 
potential brake on federal prosecutions of overwhelmingly black criminal 
defendants in St. Louis and Kansas City … except for Chief Dotson, who 
wrote an impassioned letter endorsing a gubernatorial veto of the 
statute.
169
  As Dotson described it, the conservative gun law would disrupt 
joint operations between the city’s police department and federal law 
enforcement; a problem since “federal agencies provide important 
resources in personnel, equipment, and intelligence about violent 
criminals.”170  Dotson’s public protest revealed an arguably bizarre 
synergy between robust endorsements of the Second Amendment and the 
curtailment of mass incarceration in America.
171
   
While Alexander focuses her critique of mass incarceration on 
conservative social policies stemming from the Reagan-era War on Drugs, 
the St. Louis story suggests a more complicated scenario.
172
  There, the 
ATF’s aggressive enforcement of federal gun laws, an issue that liberals 
tend to support, contributed directly to the “entrapment” of African 
Americans who might otherwise have remained clear of prison.
173
  At least 
this was the position of 7
th
 Circuit Judge Richard Posner, who expressed 
open disdain for federal gun control tactics in United States v. Kindle.
174
   
However, lifting such regulations garnered little support on the 
left.
175
  On the contrary, it was conservative support for the Second 
Amendment that promised tactics likely to disrupt black incarceration.  
Even if House Bill 436 represented an unreasonable means of slowing 
minority imprisonment in Missouri, in other words, the mere fact that rural 
conservatives flaunted the police suggests a potential paradigm shift in the 
politics of crime control in America.  According to Alexander, 
conservatives and police bonded for much of the post-Brown era, jointly 
celebrating the War on Drugs.
176
  However, that bond seems to have come 
unglued as conservative fears of government overreaching provide new 
rhetorical possibilities for curtailing criminal justice excess.  Here, the 
rhetoric of freedom and firearms provides a new frame, perhaps a more 
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powerful frame, than Alexander’s emphasis on the need to develop “an 
ethic of genuine care, compassion, and concern for every human being.”177  
Precisely such rhetoric was invoked in Missouri to kill House Bill 436, 
even as the ATF proffered its irresistible stash house schemes.178 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
That liberals endorsed both federal gun control and the War on 
Drugs is not something Michelle Alexander pays sufficient attention to in 
The New Jim Crow.
179
  Yet, liberal zeal for incarceration goes to the heart 
of her book, undermining her thesis that harsh sentences derive almost 
entirely from conservative efforts to divide the working class along racial 
lines; a thesis that she extends to the rise of racial segregation, or Jim 
Crow.  Why Alexander focuses almost exclusively on conservative efforts 
to “bribe” poor whites deserves some comment, if for no other reason than 
to place her theory within a broader, intellectual context.
180
 Mildly 
reminiscent of Marxian “false consciousness,” Alexander’s notion of a 
false working class “consensus” coincides with a long tradition of 
American historiography placing “class and economic divisions” at the 
center of politics.
181
  To such historians, including C. Vann Woodward, 
race remains primarily an “instrumental” device employed by elites to 
manipulate the poor.
182
  As historian John Cell puts it, “[r]acism is indeed 
what Lenin called false consciousness.”183  
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Yet, recent historians have begun to move away from Leninist 
takes on the origins of Jim Crow, suggesting that segregation and 
disfranchisement stemmed not simply from elite efforts to divide the poor, 
but more complex interactions between middle and upper class 
southerners, including progressive efforts to advance black interests.  As 
Section I of this article sought to demonstrate, many of the early 
supporters of racial segregation, or Jim Crow, were progressives, 
individuals who argued that separating the races promised to reduce racial 
violence and help African Americans establish their own institutions and 
traditions free from white interference and control.
184
 
That Jim Crow proved an evil system is worth underscoring, 
precisely because it demonstrates the manner in which aspirational politics 
can yield unanticipated, negative effects.  Section II provides another 
example of this, noting how liberal reforms in criminal procedure also 
contributed to mass incarceration.  Not long after the Supreme Court’s 
liberal ruling in Mapp v. Ohio, for example, reports began to emerge that 
the decision had actually wreaked unanticipated negative effects on the 
streets, prompting police to develop intrusive, violent methods of evidence 
gathering.
185
  As moderates sought to curb police procedure, they 
advanced a structured model of “stop and frisk” aimed at curbing police 
abuses.
186
  However, this model proved to have its own perverse effects, 
greatly facilitating the extent to which police could peacefully stop and 
apprehend black suspects on the street.
187
  As Alexander herself notes, the 
rise of stop and frisk provided the first vital “step” in the larger process of 
achieving “racially discriminatory results” in American criminal justice.188 
The ultimate manifestation of racial discrimination in criminal 
justice, concludes Alexander, is the War on Drugs, a campaign that she 
attributes to conservative wedge politics aimed at dividing America’s 
working class.  Yet, as Section III of this Article illustrates, liberal 
aspirations contributed to the war as well.  Not only did well-known 
democrats like Joe Biden and Gary Hart endorse harsher drug sentences 
out of an interest in helping rid black communities of drugs, but 
Democrats worked closely with Republicans on developing new 
punishment schemes, including sentencing guidelines aimed at reducing 
judicial corruption, albeit with devastating results.
189
  
Finally, current liberal enthusiasm for federal gun regulations, a 
sympathetic project in the wake of tragedies like Sandy Hook, also bears 
examination as a potential contributor to black incarceration.  As recent 
ATF stings across the Midwest reveal, federal gun laws tend to target the 
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very same minorities netted in drug prosecutions, even eliciting 
complaints of predatory policing and entrapment.  
Throughout, the history of race and policy in America points not 
simply to the persistence of prejudice, but the unanticipated pitfalls of 
reform.  Alexander’s reluctance to acknowledge this uncomfortable truth 
weakens her otherwise compelling analogy between mass incarceration 
and Jim Crow, pressing her into embracing an overly simplistic historical 
narrative of how systems of oppression evolve.  For example, Alexander 
concludes her case by underscoring the importance of enlisting 
“compassion” in the hearts of white voters sufficient to counter the 
“indifference” that has marked white attitudes towards blacks since the 
1890s.
190
  Yet, indifference and lack of compassion are arguably not the 
root causes of racial inequality in America, as this Article has sought to 
demonstrate.  Though generally associated with repression and 
discrimination, both Jim Crow and mass incarceration owe their existence 
in part to enlightened reforms aimed at promoting black interests, albeit 
with perverse results.  Recognizing the aspirational origins of systematic 
discrimination marks an important facet of comprehending the persistence 
of racial inequality in the United States.
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